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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL PROWS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, BERGIN BRUNSWIG COM-
PANY, and ASSOCIATED INDEM-
NITY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16456 
This action was commenced by Plaintiff pursuant to the 
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act seeking recovery for an alleged 
job-related accident. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
A hearing was held on January 4, 1979 before an Ad.minis-
trative Law Judge. The Judge denied compensation to Plaintiff. 
Subsequently on April 11, 1979 the Industrial Commission con-
curred with the Judge and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Review. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirrnance of the Industrial Commission's 
Order denying benefits to Plaintiff. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Court will not interfere with Orders of the Indus-
trial Conunission unless they appear contrary to law or con-
trary to evidence. Savage v. Industrial Commission, 565 P.2d 
782 (Utah 1977); Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. If there is any sub-
stantial evidence in the record to support the findings of the 
Commission and ultimate facts found by the Commission sup-
port the award, this Court cannot do otherwise than enter judg· 
ment affirming the award of the COI!lIIlission. Amalgamated Sugar 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 189 P.69 (Utah 1918). See also 
McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial Conunission (filed July 16, 
1979). This Court must therefore view the evidence concerning 
this claim from a standpoint supportive of the Commission's 
findings. Peka Spring co., Inc. v. Jones, 371 N.E.2d 389 (Ct. 
App. Ind. 1978). 
Because of the preceding standards of review, Defendants 
take exception to parts of Plaintiff's "Statement of Facts" 
as tending to omit evidence in support of the Commission's find· 
ings while tending to exaggerate or incorrectly state evidence 
favorable to Plaintiff's position. For this reason, Defendants 
would offer the following Statement of Facts as supportive of 
the Conunission's findings. 
The plaintiff had been employed at Defendant Bergin Bruns· 
wig for approximately 2 months. ( 23) He was employed R.' p. . 
d · al 
as a truck driver which included loading and unloading me ic 
-2-
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I 
I 
supplies and delivering them to various doctors and hospitals. 
(R., p. 20). 
On March 3, 1978 the plaintiff was so employed as a truck 
driver. At that time he was some 40 days short of being 22 
years old. (R., p. 4). In the mid afternoon of that day Plain-
tiff was loading boxes from a handcart in his truck. (R., p. 
28). As he was loading he was hit by an elastic band which had 
been flipped by a co-employee. (R., p. 29). The rubber band 
was used to wrap medical boxes delivered by the plaintiff and 
was some 12 inches long and 3/8 inches wide. (R., p. 47). 
Plaintiff testified that upon being hit he picked up the 
elastic band and flipped it back. He then was hit with two 
more elastic bands again flipped by two fellow employees. At 
this point one of the employees approached him with an 18-inch 
piece of wood which had been ripped off of a wooden pallet and 
came towards him playing as though it were a sword. (R., p. 21). 
Plaintiff grabbed the wood from his co-employee, placed an elas-
tic between the handles of his hand truck and used the elastic 
as a "flipper" to propel the wood piece into the air. In doing 
so, he flipped the wood piece into his own right eye. (R., P· 30). 
Plaintiff stated that his flipping of the piece of wood 
was not a reaction back to the person who had flipped him with 
the elastic but was rather a playful jesture of Plaintiff attempt-
ing to flip the wood into the air -with no target intended. (R., 
Pp. 29-30). He stated that while he got into the playful mood 
! -3-
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because of the activity of the other employees in flipping 
elastics, he quite openly admitted that his injury resulted 
from his own act and that he was the aggressor as far as flip-
ping the wood. (R., p. 33). 
David Chipman, one of the other employees involved in the 
incident, testified on behalf of Plaintiff that on the day in 
question he and another employee began to playfully flip rub-
ber bands. He stated that they were being flipped at a dis-
tance where nobody could get hurt with them. He recalled that 
after flipping several elastics he began to resume work when 
he saw the plaintiff flip a board in the air which hit Plain-
tiff in the eye. (R., pp. 36-37). 
Plaintiff characterized playful skirmishes with rubber 
bands as a frequent occurrence. (R., p. 21). Plaintiff was 
not sure exactly when or how often such play occurred but 
thought that there were rubber band skirmishes once a day al-
though there were some days where there was no play. (R., P· 1 
22) • 
Mr. Gary Leavitt, Operation Manager of Bergin Brunswig, 
testified that he was the supervisor of the plaintiff. (R., Pf· i 
41-42). He related that he had, at times, seen elastics flippe; 
by the employees but that the bands being flipped were at a dis· 
be done (R. I P. 47) and that he would tance where no harm could 
. h activ1: 
always verbally warn the employees not to engage in sue 
(R., p. 43). Ile stated that his job was to cover the whOle 
-4-
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warehouse, that he was not aware of rubber band fighting as a 
daily occurrence, and that at the most he only observed such 
activity two or three times a month. (R. I pp. 46-48). 
Mr. Leavitt had never seen any of the employees using rub-
ber bands as a bow and arrow for flipping pieces of wood or 
any other objects. (R., p. 48). He had never given permission 
to use the elastics for such a bow and arrow purpose. (R. I p. 
48). Neither had he given permission to use elastics for any 
purpose nor was it any employee's function to flip elastics in 
the business. (R., p. 44). The plaintiff acknowledged that 
flipping elastics was not the assigned duty of any employee in-
eluding himself. (R. I p. 29) • 
A claim for compensation was filed against the defendants 
and accordingly a hearing was held on January 4, 1979 before an 
Administrative Law Judge. The Judge subsequently entered his 
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order" finding that 
the plaintiff was engaging in "horseplay" at the time of his ac-
cident so his accident did not arise out of nor was it within 
the scope of his employment. (R. I pp •. 85-87). 
A Motion for Review was filed by Plaintiff and denied by 
the Industrial commission on April 11, 1979 with the Commission 
adopting the Judge's findings except for a minor error refer-
ring to a non-existent medical panel report. (R. I p. 97) • 
. 
Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Review on May 9, 
197 9 challenging the commission's denial of compensation. 
_.,_ 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DENIED COMPENSA-
TION TO PLAINTIFF SINCE THE INJURY DID NOT 
"ARISE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF" PLAIN-
TIFF'S EMPLOYMENT. 
The Administrative Law Judge in his Findings of Fact statE: 
the following: 
4. The horseplay was not related in any 
way to the performance of the applicant's 
job duties but rather represents a complete 
abandonment of the employee's duties. At 
the time of the accident neither the appli-
cant nor any of the other employees involved 
in the horseplay were carrying out their as-
signed tasks. 
5. The applicant has failed to prove that 
his accident arose out of or was in the 
scope of his employment. (R., p. 87). 
It is a well established rule in Utah that the Findings 
Conclusions of the Industrial Commission are binding upon this 
Court if there is credible, competent evidence to support them. 
Whitmore v. Calavo Growers of California, 499 P.2d 848 (Utah 
1972); Utah Packers Inc. v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, 
469 P.2d 500 (Utah 1970). 
Thus, the findings of the Commission must be adhered to 
by this Court unless Plaintiff can show there is no evidence 
to support them. In addition, Plaintiff must further show that' 
the Commission failed to follow the law in Utah concerning 
"horseplay" injuries. A review of the record and of the appli· 
-6-
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cable law reveals that Plaintiff is unable to meet either of 
these requirements. 
A. The Industrial Commission's Findings and Conclusions 
are Based Upon Substantial Evidence. 
Plaintiff claims in his brief that the Industrial CoI!1Illis-
sion substantially deviated from the evidence by making inac-
curate and incomplete findings. (Plaintiff's brief, pp. 11-14}. 
Plaintiff has failed, however, to support such claim in his 
brief with specific instances where such findings are inaccurate 
and has therefore waived any such challenge. In re Lavelle's 
Estate, 248 P.2d 372 (Utah 1953). 
Plaintiff argues that the failure to refer this matter to 
a medical panel constitutes reversible error in light of this 
Court's decision in Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 
616 (Utah 1979). Obviously, the facts in that case and the 
facts in this case are entirely distinguishable. 
In Lipman the sole issue was whether job-caused stress in-
duced injury or death in such a manner as to be compensable. As 
this Court stated: 
The findings of a medical panel may assist in 
determining whether the death was caused by 
accident~ Id. at 618. 
In the instant case, however, there is no doubt as to the 
cause of the injury which is simply Plaintiff's own action in 
Projecting the wooden spear into the air. The convening of a 
medical panel in such a case would serve no purpose since, as a 
-7-
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matter of law, the Connnission accepted the cause of the injury 
but ruled that it did not .come within the statutory requirement 
for compensation. 
In cases such as this involving denial of claims based 
upon matters of law and not upon factual disputes (as to either 
the cause of an injury or the extent of an injury) it would 
seem that Section 35-1-77, U.C.A. would not apply since there 
would be no "medical aspects" of the case. 
For these reasons, Plaintiff's assault upon the C01mnission' 
I 
findings is without merit. 
B. The Injury Did Not "Arise Out of Plaintiff's Employ· 
ment." ' 
I Plaintiff admitted that at the time of the accident he was I 
! 
not performing an assigned duty. (R., p. 29). Mr. Leavitt, 
Plaintiff's supervisor, also substantiated this fact. (,R., P· 1 
34). 
This Court has stated that the words "arising out of" are 
I 
construed to refer to the origin or cause of the injury. For an 1 
.I 
accident to "arise out of employment" a definite and close causo.: 
I : 
relationship is necessary between the injury and the employee 5 '1 
job activities. M. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Cornmissi~, 
189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948). 
Plaintiff's injury did not result from his job activity 
and therefore did not "arise" from his employment. As stated 
by one authority: 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is generally held that no compensation is 
~ecoverable under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, for injuries sustained through practical 
joking, horseplay, or sportive acts done in-
dependently of and disconnected from the per-
formance of any duty of the employment, since 
such injuries cannot ordinarily be regarded as 
having risen out of the employment within the 
meaning of the Act. 82 Am.Jur.2d, Sect. 314, 
p. 105. (Emphasis added). 
On the other hand, a non-participating victim who is per-
forming his job and is injured by a prank of a co-employee is 
deemed to have suffered the injury arising out of his employ-
ment since he was injured while performing his job. Pacific 
Employers Insurance Company v. Industrial Accident Commission, 
158 P.2d 9 (Cal. App. 1936); Swift and Co. v. Forbus, 207 P.2d 
251 (_Okla. 1950). 
The evidence is clear that Plaintiff was not performing an 
assigned job function at the time of the accident. It is equally 
clear that whether Plaintiff be termed an "aggressor".or not he 
was definitely a participant in the horseplay and was not an 
innocent "non-participant" who was injured by the acts of others. 
For these reasons, Plaintiff's injury is not compensable 
as "arising out" of his employment. 
c. The Injury Did Not 11Arise in the Course of Plaintiff's 
Employment." 
The words "in the course of" employment have been defined 
by this Court to refer to the time, place, and circumstances un-
der which the injury occurred. This Court has stated: 
-9-
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In other words the requirement that the acci-
dent arise in the course of the employment is 
satisfied if it occurs while the employee is 
rendering service to his employer which he was 
hired to do or doing something incidental 
thereto, at the time when and the place where 
he was authorized to render such service. M. 
& K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 189 
P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948). 
This Court has stated that when an employee interrupts or 
breaks the continuity of his employment for purposes of his ow 
whether for recreation or pleasure, and the accident happens 
before he brings himself back into the line of his employment, 
the injury resulting is not compensable because it does not 
occur in the course of his employment. Sullivan v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 10 P.2d 924 (Utah 1932). 
Many states have adopted the so-called "Aggressor Defense 
which states that when an employee affirmatively instigates 
horseplay or other frivolous activity that the employee steps 
aside from his employment and any injuries occurring are non-
compensable. See 1-A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec· 
tion 23.30, pp. 5-126 to 5-128. Defendants submit that the 
adoption of this test in Utah allows an objective and reliable 
method of determining when "horseplay" prevents recovery. sue 
an adoption would eliminate the need to subjectively evaluate 
a number of factors and would thus create a workable and con-
stant standard. 
Another approach to the "horseplay" defense is offered by 
the noted authority, Professor Arthur Larson in his treatise. 
-10-
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Larson states that where an active participant or instigator 
is involved, the question is solely whether the horseplay con-
stitutes a departure from course of employment and he proposes 
that the following four elements should be considered in an-
swering that question: 
1. The extent and seriousness of the de-
viation, 
2. The completeness of the deviation (i.e., 
whether it was comingled with the performance 
or involved an abandonment of duty}, 
3. The extent to which the practice of 
horseplay had become an accepted part of the 
employment, 
4. The extent to which the nature of the em-
ployment may be expected to include some such 
horseplay. 1-A Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
Law, Section 23, pp. 5-122. 
It still remains for the fact finder to evaluate and weigh 
each element individually and collectively to determine the ex-
tent of the deviation. No set formula exists as to how many 
of these elements are necessary for compensation to be denied. 
Even applying this more liberal test, however, to the facts 
of this case still supports the determination of the Commission 
that no compensable injury occurred. 
1. The Extent and Seriousness of the Deviation. 
There is no question here that Plaintiff was an active par-
ticipant in the elastic flipping that led to the accident. 
testified that just prior to the accident he had flipped one 
elastic at a co-employee and that he used another elastic to 
-11-
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span the handles of his hand truck. (R. , p . 2 9 ) . He then 
grabbed the wooden stick, used the elastic as a bow, and 
flipped the piece of wood into the air for no reason except 
to be "playful." (R., pp. 30, 33). Of course, there is no 
way of knowing how long this activity would have continued but 
for the injury. 
The California Appellate Court in the recent case of Hodge; 
v. Worker; s Col"lpensation Appeals Board, 147 Cal.2d 546 (Cal. 
App. 1978) held that a car salesman who walked out of a door ar.: 
began to box with another salesman was not entitled to compen-
sation for injuries suffered in the horseplay. The applicant i:. 
that case argued that the conduct was so insubstantial of a de-
viation that the injury occurred within the course of employmen: 
as a matter of law. The California Court rejected this conten-
tion and noted that even though the horseplay lasted only fora 
brief period of time and did not occur off of the employer's pn 
mises there was ample evidence to show that the deviation from 
employment was complete and substantial. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Horn v. Broadway Garage, 99 
P.2d 150 (Okla. 1940) held that an employee who placed a broken 
paper clip on a rubber band and shot it into his eye could not 
recover under the compensation law since his act was disconnec-
ted from his employment activities. 
Al though the extent and seriousness of the deviation would 
f' have been greater had Plaintiff chased the other employees 0 -
-12- ,,,,,,,, 
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of the premises or continued the attack for a JO-minute period, 
the substance of the abandonment from his assigned task would 
still be no different. 
2. Completeness of Deviation. 
When an employee horseplays in the form of a whimsical 
method of performing his assigned duties an insubstantial de-
viation has occurred. In other words, when an employee is re-
quired to go to a time clock but does so by racing a co-employee, 
the deviation is minor since the activity involves a job-related 
assignment. Larson, Section 23.62(A), p. 5-143. 
This rule has been basically recognized by this Court in 
M. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission where it was held 
that only in cases where an act or service which an employee is 
performing at the time of accident is itself prohibited (as dis-
tinguished from the manner in which an act is done or a service 
is performed) does the violation of the statutory provision or 
rule take the employee from the "course of employment" within 
the meaning of the compensation Act. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948). 
In this case, clearly, the act of flipping elastics or 
wooden pieces was not a mere deviation of an assigned task but 
was an abandonment of the work itself. 
Larson also observed the following additional test: 
If the primary test in horseplay cases is de-
viation from employment, the question whether 
the horseplay involved the dropping ~f active 
duties calling for claimant's attention as 
distinguished from a mere killing of time while 
-13-
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claimant had nothing to do assumes consider-
able importance. There are two reasons for 
this: first, if there were no duties to be 
performed, there were none to be abandoned· 
and second, it is co!lllllon knowledge, embodi~d 
in more than one old saw, that idleness breeds 
mischief, so that if idleness is a fixture of 
the employment, its handmaiden mischief is 
also. Larson, Section 23, 65, p. 5-157. (Em-
phasis added). 
·Again, the testimony is clear that Plaintiff was working 
at the time the incident began and had to abandon his work in 
order to engage in the elastic band battle. (R.' p. 28). 
Likewise, David Chipman had to interrupt his work in order to 
participate. (R. , p. 3 6) • 
Clearly, the second criteria under the Larson formula 
would dictate denial of coverage. 
3. The Extent to Which the Practice of Horseplay 
Had Become an Accepted Part of Employment. 
In the absence of actual knowledge and condonation by the 
employer, the prime requisite is that the particular horseplay 
involved was engaged in so frequently or habitually that it hac 
become customary and might fairly be said to be a regular inci· 
dent of the employment. Hodges v. Worker's Compensation Appeal 
Board, 147 Ca. Rptr.2d 546 (Cal. App. 1978). 
In considering whether or not the horseplay giving rise 
to the injury had become an accepted part of the employment, 
one must look to the testimony given at the hearing. 1\lthough 
the plaintiff and one of his co-employees testified that elasti 
· f iec band flipping was a frequent occurrence, Mr. Leavitt testi 
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that he only had observed this activity two or three times a 
month. (R., pp. 22, 36, 43). The Commission had the right 
to believe or disbelieve the witnesses and the acceptance by 
the Commission of conflicting evidence cannot be reviewed on 
appeal. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 266 P. 721 (Utah 1928). 
David Chipman stated that the flipping of the bands was 
always at a distance where "nobody gets hurt with them." (R., 
p. 36). Mr. Leavitt likewise stated that the flipping he ob-
served was at a distance where it would not be harmful. (R., 
p. 47). 
Most importantly, Mr. Leavitt stated that he had never 
seen any employee using rubber bands as a bow and a~row to pro-
pel other objects. (R., p. 48). Neither was there a showing 
by the plaintiff that such a practice was customary. 
In addition, Mr. Leavitt stated that each time he observed 
the elastic flipping he had asked the employees to stop. The 
company did not condone such activity. In any event, however, 
the activity which Mr. Leavitt saw was not the dangerous activ-
ity which caused the injury in this case. 
The Hodges case is again analogous to this situation. In 
that case there was evidence that employees had frequently en-
gaged in throwing a football or tennis ball. There was some 
evidence that the employer was aware of this practice. However, 
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the employees had never engaged in a sparring boxing match 
and the clabnant hbnself testified he did not think that that 
kind of activity would be allowed. 147 ca. Rptr. 546. 
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the company somehow 
condoned the elastic band flipping practice, it cannot be sale 
that it was aware or could have foreseen that the elastic band 
flipping would result in 18-inch projectiles being propelled 
by the flipper mechanism created by Plaintiff. Obviously, the 
flipping of a large piece of wood at a close distance is a con· 
siderably different risk than shooting an elastic band from a 
long distance. 
For these reasons the third criteria also mandates denial 
of compensation. 
4. The Extent to Which the Nature of the Employment 
May be Expected to Include Some Such Horseplay. 
The fourth factor in Larson's test involves a foreseeabili: 
or predictability in the type of activity which is being per· 
formed. In other words, some types of employment will lend th~i 
to occurrences which may be considered a part of the employment 
generally even when it happens the first time at a particular 
job. As stated by Larson: 
For example, if an employer hires a gang of 
young boys to pick ripe tomatoes, it needs no 
long continued personal tradition to reveal 
that sooner or later a tomato will be thrown 
and if a new restaurant is set up with a door 
through which waiters must pass at close 
quarters hundreds of times a day, perhaps the 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
employer should be held to know on his very 
firs~ day in business ~hat waiters will nudge 
and JOstle each other in that doorway, since 
that is the experience of the restaurant busi-
ness generally, even if he himself has not 
yet had time to acquire that experience.. Lar-
son, Section 23.42, pp. 5-134 to 5-135. 
Larson also notes that Longshoremen, "truck loaders", 
ditch diggers, and other workers whose duties are largely a 
matter of using their muscles will inevitably prove their box-
ing and wrestling skills whenever they are not kept busy. Id. 
at p. 5-135. 
Certainly, it could be expected that the truck loaders in 
this job activity would occasionally perform horseplay in some 
physical manner. However, it is not foreseeable that 22-year-
old men would flip elastics or other projectiles at each other. 
It is especially unlikely that any employ.er in this situation 
would believe that a person of the age of Plaintiff would do 
something so dangerous and foolish as to flip an 18-inch piece 
of wood haphazardly into the air. 
For these reasons, the fourth criteria of the Larson for-
mula also requires denial of compensation. 
In summary, this case can be again likened to the Hodges 
decision where the California court there said: 
It is true the horseplay lasted but a brief 
period cut short by applicant's injury and 
that it did not take him off the employer's 
premises. However, as the judge correctly 
observed in his report and recmmnendation on 
the Petition for Reconsideration, which was 
adopted by the Board: "There was no comin-
gling of performance of duty with the horse-
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play, the deviation was complete, there is 
no evidence or even any real inference that 
the practice of horseplay had become an.ac-
cepted part of the employment and there was 
certainly no evidence that the nature of 
the employment would include any horseplay." 
147 Cal. Rptr. at 552-553. 
D. The Cases Cited by Plaintiff are Distinguishable. 
Plaintiff cites several cases in support of his positi~ 
that compensation should be allowed. Plaintiff Is reliance upo:, 
the Twin Peak's Canning Company case is misplaced. In that cas 
a fifteen-year-old boy was working on the first floor of a can· 
nery with another boy. Their job was to stop cans which were 
being dropped down a chute from a second floor. It was a com· 
men occurrence for the boys to ride the elevator to the second 
floor numerous tiJnes during the day when a lull occurred during 
the work. 
On the day of the accident such a lull did occur and the 
decedent turned off the elevator while it was halfway between t 
floors as a practical joke on his friend who was inside. Later 
in an attempt to reactivate the elevator the decedent was crush 
by its upward assent. 
The Co.mmission in that case made specific findings that tb 
boy was in the course of employment at the tiJne of the accident 
This Court noted that just because an employee is not wor~· 
ing at his usual duties or directly engaged in anything connec· 
ted with those duties does not necessarily prevent him frolil re· 
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covering compensation. The Court then made the following im-
portant distinction: 
If during his working hours there are inter-
vals of leisure he may, during such inter-
vals, within reasonable limits, move from 
place to place on the premises of the employer. 
196 P. at 858 (Emphasis added). 
The Court then noted that employees will have the desire to 
visit other employees and that this does not remove them from 
the course of employment. The Court then noted: 
Every employer understands that, in case boys 
of immature years are employed, he is charged 
with notice of their natural propensities to 
congregate, to cOillillUnicate, and to play with 
one another. If, therefore, the employer em-
ploys any boys and girls and gives them work 
which is not continuous, so that there are in-
tervals of leisure, he must assume that during 
such intervals they may seek communion with 
their fellow workmen, and he therefore must 
govern himself accordingly. Id. at 858. (Em-
phasis added) . 
Finally, the Court noted that the age of the victim was an 
important factor and that "We are here not dealing with an 
adult, with a man of mature years and experience, but with a 
mere boy without experience and with an abundance of life and 
vigor." And the court concluded by saying, "It is true that in 
some of its aspects this may be a borderline case, and if the 
deceased had been a man of mature years and experience we might 
have reached a different conclusion." Id. at 859. 
Thus, the Twin Peaks case can be distinguished on three 
grounds: first, the findings in that case by the trier of fact 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lthe Industrial COlllIIlissionl found in favor of the employee 
while in this case it found against Plaintiff; second, the de· 
cedent in Twin Peaks was a boy of 15 years whereas the plain-
tiff in this case is a man of 22 years; and third, the boy in 
Twin Peaks was killed during a lull in the work where he had 
no work to perform at the time of the death whereas in this ca: 
Plaintiff was actively engaged in work when he abandoned this 
work for the elastic band battle. 
In any event, the Twin Peaks decision was rendered in 191: 
and certainly this Court can now re-evaluate the factors to be 
used in deciding whether a "horseplay" accident should be comp1 
sable under Utah's existing standards and laws. 
Likewise the Cassell, the Kansas City Fiber Box Company, 
and Socha cases cited by Plaintiff (Brief, pp. 8-9) were all de 
cided between 1921 and 1926' and do not necessarily reflect cur· 
rent developments in working conditions and modern-day require· 
ments. In addition, the Socha case deals with an injured emplc 
who was a non-participating victim of the horseplay and the ade 
quacy of warning was questioned where they were provided by the 
employer in English to Polish speaking employees. 
Finally, Plaintiff asks that the Workmen's Compensations: 
tute be interpreted liberally in his favor. In answering a si· 
milar appeal for liberal construction the Indiana Appellate Coe 
noted, "The limits of liberality have already been reached in 
the 'horseplay analysis.'" 
. D · ision, Block v. Fruehauf Trailer iv.---
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
262 N.e.2d 612 llnd. App. 19691. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is compelled by statute and stare decisis to 
affirm the Commission's decision if it is support by substan-
tial evidence. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge, as 
corrected, are supported by the evidence. Plaintiff has failed 
to raise these alleged errors and has therefore waived any com-
plaint he may now have. The medical panel requirement is not 
applicable to this case. 
Plaintiff himself testified that his activity at the time 
of the accident did not "arise from" his employment duties. It 
is obvious, therefore, that the first alternative requirement 
of the statute has not been met. 
Likewise, Plaintiff cannot be said to have been perfor:m-
ing "in the course of" his employment since his activities re-
moved him from such status. 
The plaintiff is neither an "innocent victim'' nor a "boy 
of youthful age." (Plaintiff's brief, p. 10). Plaintiff at 
the time of the injury was the sole participant in the activity 
and admitted that, as to the wood flipping, he ~as the aggres-
sor. The age of 22 makes the plaintiff a young man who should 
have some judgment and wisdom as to dangers inherent in horse-
play activities. 
. 11 By being the aggressor, many states would autamatica Y 
conclude that Plaintiff was outside his scope of employment. 
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Even the more liberal views which analyze the extent of de · Vla• 
tion would have to also conclude that Plaintiff withdrew hm-
self from the scope of his employment. 
The extent of his deviation was substantial in that he 
abandoned his active work and completely concentrated on the 
horseplay activities. There was no evidence that his employer 
approved or was aware of Plaintiff's bow and arrow horseplay 
even assuming that the employer was aware of the practice of 
flipping elastics from a safe distance. The employer warned 
the employees not to flip elastics. Finally, there is nothing 
inherent in Plaintiff's occupation to suggest that this ty~~ 
horseplay would occur. 
The cases cited by the plaintiff are readf ly distingui~ 
able both upon their facts and upon their antiquity since the 
law of workmen's compensation is dependent upon the factual cor 
text of each case and upon the ever changing concept of employ1 
employee relations. 
For these reasons, the Order of the Commission denying 
compensation should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-22-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
